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Taxation of wine and beer has been the frequent subject of litigation before the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the light of the second paragraph of Article 90.1 
The distinction between beer and wine is recognized as being of capital importance by 
the European legislator. Directives 92/83/EEC and 92/84/EEC apply different rules 
to beer and wine in terms of excise duties.2 The popularity of these alcoholic 
beverages partially explains this interest, but it is their differences which are crucial 
to their tax treatment. In Case C-167/05, the Court was once again called to give 
answers to the question of taxation of wine and beer in the light of Article 90. 
Contrary to the Opinion of the Advocate General, the ECJ’s judgment of April 8, 
2008, dismissed as unfounded the Commission’s action for infringement of 
Community law by Swedish law. According to the Commission’s allegations, Swedish 
tax regulations on alcohol discriminated against wine (an imported beverage) in favor 
of beer (a widely nationally-produced product). 
 
The Court’s judgment is particularly interesting for it allows apprehension of the 
accuracy as well as the limits of the method applied. Also, the case concerned 
Sweden, a State that has a well-established anti-alcoholic public policy, mainly 
through its retail sale monopoly and the highest excise duties on alcohol in Europe.3 
In the Rosengren Case,4 the Court examined the Swedish retail sale monopoly in the 
light of the free movement of goods (Article 28 of the EC Treaty). In Case C-167/05, 
anti-alcoholic objectives stayed very much in the background and the major issue was 
the consumer’s attitude towards selling prices of alcoholic beverages.  
 
The paper argues that the appreciation of the consumer’s attitude in the ECJ’s case –
law on taxation of alcohol, especially wine and beer – is problematic and proposes a 
new approach to the question that puts consumers’ sensibility towards tax 
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  1 arrangement at the centre of judicial control while it calls for a clearer apprehension 
of the anti-alcoholic claim which is often behind taxation of alcohol.  
 
I. Article 90 EC and the consumers’ attitude claim 
 
The realization of the common market justifies legal action in order to control and 
neutralize the taxing power of the Member States.5 The taxing power of Member 
States stands as a potential protectionist instrument threatening the realization of the 
common market.6 Thus, neutrality of taxation regarding trade between the Member 
States is a key element of the economic Constitution of the European Union.7  
 
In order to insure this tax neutrality towards European products, including alcoholic 
beverages, EC Law uses two methods: harmonization and negative integration 
through judicial control. On the basis of Article 93 EC, tax harmonization of excise 
duty on alcohol has been achieved to a certain extent. Although fixing tax rates 
remains a national competence, the structure of excise duties8 and the minimum 
rates to apply9 are set by Directives. This harmonization process is combined with the 
control on national tax systems exercised by national courts as well as by the ECJ on 
the basis of Article 90, whose scope is to insure that the national tax system does not 
protect national products to the detriment of those imported by another Member 
State.10 
 
In order to cover discriminative tax arrangements in full, Article 90 EC introduces 
two distinctive but complementary levels of comparison.  
 
According to its first paragraph, “[n]o Member State shall impose, directly or 
indirectly, on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of any kind 
in excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products”. As the 
Court explained in Case 168/78 this is the “basic rule” of Article 90 and is “based on a 
comparison of the tax burdens imposed on domestic products and on imported 
products which may be classified as “similar”.11 Whereas direct discrimination is 
based on the origin of the (imported) product, it is the problem of indirect 
discrimination that necessitates a far more sophisticated analysis, for unequal 
treatment is not the result of a reference to the origin of the product but in fact 
imposes a specific burden on imported products.  
 
As for the question of “similar products”, it is interpreted with flexibility in order to 
cover a wide range of products that share the same characteristics.12 The ECJ fixes 
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  2 two criteria in this context.13 According to its case law, domestic and imported 
products are “similar” when they “have similar characteristics and meet the same 
needs from the point of view of consumers”.14 As the Court explains, the idea is not to 
examine whether the concerned products are identical but to check “their similar and 
comparable use”.15 From this perspective, it is the social and economic use of the 
product that dictates its similarity with other products, rather than any formal and 
“objective” taxonomy. In other words, it is the context of consumption and the 
consumer’s attitude that come under consideration.16 Products are qualified as 
similar – actually or potentially – because consumers apprehend them as such. 
 
This concern for the consumers’ perception is more important in the case of Article 
90’s second paragraph, which provides that “[f]urthermore, no Member State shall 
impose on the products of other Member States any internal taxation of such a 
nature as to afford indirect protection to other products”. This provision covers the 
case of those domestic products which, though not “similar” in the sense of the first 
paragraph, are nevertheless in competition, partial, indirect or potential, with 
imported products.17. Delimitating the field of application between “similar” and 
“competitive” products is not a simple task. Though complementary to the first 
paragraph, this provision is based on a fundamentally different logic.  
 
Here, equal treatment is not checked on the basis of tax burdens but calls for a deeper 
evaluation of the protective consequences of internal taxation on domestic products. 
Thus, the question is not to identify similar products and then check their tax 
treatment but rather appreciate how the tax system can favor internal products. This 
approach dictates a far deeper economic analysis of the effect of taxation on 
consumption than the arithmetical comparison of tax burdens.18 The competition 
criterion focuses on the economic uses to which the domestic products may be put 
and on the effect of taxation on these uses.19  
 
Consequently, the importance of consumer attitude is twofold here. On the one hand, 
it is the major criterion for identifying which products enter into competition. It is the 
consumer’s potential choices and perceptions that make products an alternative to 
each other, even though they cannot be qualified as “similar”. On the other hand – 
and it is by far the most difficult element in this method – the consumer’s attitude is 
the critical element in affirming any indirect protection for domestic products. The 
impact of taxation on final selling price can be a decisive factor for the consumer’s 
choice of domestic rather than competing imported products. This protective nature 
is qualifies is objective for there is no need to prove the Member State’s intention to 
fix a protective system through taxation. The control is based on the effects of 
national tax treatment on the consuming attitudes. 
 
Applying this method is, however, a particularly difficult task. Despite this objective 
qualification of the protective nature of tax arrangements, the breach of Article 90’s 
                                                 
13 Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU (Oxford University Press 2004) 49, refers to the 
“double test” applied by the Court in order to determine similarity. 
14 Case 45/75 Rewe [1976 ] ECR 181. 
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16 See for instance Case C-230/89 Commission v. Greece [1991] ECR I-1909. 
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  3 second paragraph necessitates an appreciation of consumer attitude as a result of 
these arrangements. Although the introduction of the second paragraph was 
supposed to facilitate the control of national tax rules whenever similarity between 
products was hard to establish, it appears in practice that the enforcement of this 
provision is subject to difficult economic evaluations. Of course, in Case C-167/05, 
the Advocate General P. Mengozzi emphasized that according to the Court’s case-
law,20 for the application of Article 90’s second paragraph it is sufficient that the 
national tax system is “likely” to bring the protective effect referred to by the Treaty.21 
It is precisely, however, the potential character of protective effect that calls for an 
evaluation of such a complex question as the consumer’s potential attitude towards 
products. Indeed, a heavier taxation of imported products cannot explain by itself the 
consumer’s choice of domestic competing ones. This is why it is necessary to establish 
case by case the role of different taxation in the final choice of consumers.  
 
II. The ECJ’s method  
 
In order to apply Article 90 EC under workable conditions, the ECJ had to establish a 
precise method of analysis of national tax systems. This method contains several 
different steps.  
 
First, the Court determines which paragraph of Article 90 is applicable. As we have 
previously mentioned, the analysis is appreciably different in each case. Thus, the 
ECJ examines whether the relevant national and imported products are “similar” 
according to the criteria we have already mentioned. If they were classed as similar 
because of their production characteristics or their economic use, then tax burdens 
would be compared in terms of the rate, the mode of assessment or other tax rules 
applicable.22 
 
Second, if similarity between products is not proved, it is still possible to water down 
national tax rules on the basis of the second paragraph of Article 90.23 In this sense, a 
competitive relationship should be established between domestic and imported 
products.24 This relationship should be lasting and characteristic but nonetheless it 
can be only partial, indirect or potential.25 In other words, there is a competitive 
relationship whenever national and imported products are “mutually substitutable” 
in the sense that they are capable of meeting identical needs. 
 
Third, should this competitive relationship be established, the Court compares tax 
arrangements in order to identify differences in tax treatment. This comparison 
proves to be far less difficult than the comparison of tax burdens in the case of the 
                                                 
20 Case 170/78, Commission v. United Kingdom II [1983] ECR 2265, paragraph 10; Case 356/85, cited 
above, para. 11. 
21 Case C-167/05, cited above, Opinion of the Advocate General, para. 60. 
22 Case 168/78, cited above. 
23 Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, cited above, p. 57 underlines that “as the Beer 
and Wine Cases show, the tests applied to both provisions do overlap”.  
24 See Opinion of the Advocate General, Case C-167/05, cited above, para. 42. 
25 The Advocate General Megozzi (case C-167/05, cited above, footnote 15) is absolutely right when he 
underlines the confusing case law of the ECJ that tends to assimilate “similar” and “competitive” 
products. This confusion was, however, unavoidable since the Court decided to apprehend “similarity” 
in terms of economic use rather than simple product characteristics and,thus permit the “intrusion” of 
the first paragraph of Article 90 to the cases that s h o u l d  i n i t i a l l y  b e  r u l e d  b y  t h e  s e c o n d  m o r e  
“economics-related” second paragraph.  
  4 first paragraph of Article 90, because here compared products are largely dissimilar. 
This is obvious in the case of alcohol taxation for, as we will see, tax rates apply to 
beverages with structural differences, such as alcohol strength.  
 
Finally, in case tax arrangements are found to differ, it is necessary to examine 
whether these arrangements are “discriminatory in nature”. That means that the 
Court needs to check the protectionist consequences (even indirect and potential) of 
these different tax arrangements. This last condition is by far the most difficult to 
satisfy, in terms of burden of proof. As we will see, it is the consumer’s attitude that 
renders this element particularly complex. 
 
III. Beer v. Wine: the application of the Court’s method  
 
The recurring interest in comparing wine and beer taxation is not explained solely by 
the popularity of these alcoholic beverages. Their geographical origin and the 
consuming attitudes related to these origins shape a very interesting context of 
competition and potential national protectionism. In fact, behind the dilemma of 
wine or beer, is a “clash of civilizations” in alcoholic drinking. Wine is produced in 
few Member States, mainly in the South (though Champagne, German and Austrian 
wine need to be mentioned), whereas beer is manufactured in Northern countries. It 
is all but coincidence that ECJ’s relevant case law concerns actions introduced by the 
Commission against Member States like the United Kingdom, Belgium or Sweden, 
suspected of tax discrimination against wine. It goes without saying that, inversely, 
wine-producing Member States may discriminate against beer. If statistically there 
are more cases of discrimination against wine, it is basically because wine’s structural 
features facilitate indirect tax discrimination compared with beer. 
 
Indeed, beer and wine are not “similar” products in the sense of the first paragraph of 
Article 90, at least when it is read literally. In terms of production conditions and 
characteristics, whilst wine is an agricultural product, with an elevated cost of 
production and subject to climate vicissitudes, beer is an industrial product.26 Owing 
to these capital differences, the Court constantly examines the question of tax 
treatment of these products in the light of the second paragraph of Article 90. 
 
“Mutual substitutability” is also seriously questioned in the case of wine and beer 
comparison. The great variety of wines in terms of characteristics, quality or price is 
not equivalent to the far narrower variety of beers. Thus, isolating “competitive” 
products dictates a sophisticated delimitation of those beverages, especially wines 
coming into competition with “strong” beer, meaning beer with an alcohol strength 
around 5% that is widely consumed. The Court holds that the wines which are 
comparable to beer are the ones that are more accessible to the public, which means 
lighter and less expensive wines.27 I n  f a c t ,  t h i s  c o m p a r ison is based on the 
consumer’s attitude in front of the shelves of a store that faces the dilemma “beer or 
wine?”. Conversely, different tax rules may legally apply to alcoholic beverages that 
are not in the same category (e.g. expensive wines) leaving therefore an important 
margin of appreciation to Member States.  
                                                 
26 See the Opinion of the Advocate General, cited above, para. 45; it should be recalled that this was the 
point of view of the Italian Government which intervened in Case 170/78, Commission  v. United 
Kingdom, cited above, para. 15. 
27 Case C-167/05, Commission v. Sweden, cited above, para. 43, referring to Case 356/85,Commission 
v. Belgium, cited above, para. 10. 
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The next step in the ECJ’s method is also subject to difficulties in the case of wine and 
beer comparison. Directive 92/83/EEC proceeds to harmonization of the structure of 
excise duties but leaves an important margin of appreciation to Member States which 
can not merely fix the rate of duties but also choose different methods of applying 
these duties. The ECJ identifies three different factors verify if tax burdens on wine 
and beer are unequal: volume, alcoholic burdens and product price.28 
 
Choosing the most relevant factor for assessing the taxation relationship between 
wine and beer depends largely on the method applied by the national tax system. In 
Case C-167/05 the Court compared tax burdens on the basis of alcohol strength by 
volume of the beverage, as this factor was used by Swedish Law as the tax base for 
determining excise duty. The accuracy of this approach can be seriously questioned, 
for the Court applies the criterion chosen by a national tax system that is “accused” of 
protectionism. In any case, the Court’s additional justification of its choice seems far 
more convincing, as it underscored the “objective” character of this criterion. Indeed, 
as we will see, it appears that it can be a reliable criterion for assessment especially 
when it comes to using taxation as a public policy instrument for anti-alcoholic 
action. The problem is that this objectivity is limited and should not have an 
axiomatic character that eventually excludes any cross-checking through other, more 
sophisticated, methods.  
 
The Court’s position at the final step of its method is the most problematic. In order 
to determine whether higher taxation of imported products has an effect on their 
potential consumption to the benefit of national competitive alcoholic beverages, the 
Court has regard to the difference between the selling prices of the competitive 
products and the impact of that difference on the consumer’s choices.29 
 
From this perspective, the Court examines the impact of taxation on consumption at 
levels of individual consuming attitude and collective consumption tendencies. 
 
Concerning the first level, the Court applied in Case C-167/05 the method of 
relationship (ratio) of final selling prices between a liter of strong beer and a liter of 
wine in competition and compared this relationship with the one that would apply if 
tax rates of beer were applied to wine. Thus, the Court found that the relationship 
between final selling prices of beer and wine would be 1 : 2.1 instead of the actual 1 : 2 
.3. In this sense, the ECJ considered that the impact of higher taxation on wine would 
be “virtually the same”. According to the Court’s reasoning, given the important 
difference of the final selling prices the fluctuation of the ratio is not likely to change 
the consumer’s attitude.  
 
As for large-scale consuming tendencies, the Court found that previous change of 
taxation on wine and beer proves, at the most, a certain sensitivity of Swedes to prices 
and even though variations in prices seemed to have impact on consumption over a 
short period, no long-term changes in consumer habits in favor of beer have been 
established.30 
 
                                                 
28 Case 170/78, cited above, para. 18. 
29 Case C-367/93 Roders and Others, [1995] ECR I-2229, para 39. 
30 Case C-167/05 Commission v. Sweden, cited above, para. 59. 
  6 The ECJ’s approach in this final step of its control method should, however, be 
seriously questioned for a number of reasons. 
 
First, the Court examines the question of the consumer’s attitude in terms of sales 
prices in an excessively mechanical manner. The method of comparing the final 
selling price applied to a liter of wine and a liter of beer is not convincing, since it 
neglects selling and marketing policies. These competitive products are usually sold 
in other units of quantity (bottles, cans, plastic or paper packages), an element that 
should not be underestimated when the impact of selling price and taxation on the 
consumer’s choice is investigated. One does not need to be an expert in marketing to 
understand that it is impossible to see the impact of taxation in terms of price per 
liter when wine is sold in 0.75 liter bottles and beer in 0.33 liter cans.  
 
The argument about the relationship between final selling prices of wine and beer is 
also problematic. Fixing such a ratio and comparing it with the hypothetical 
relationship of prices if beer tax rates were applied to wine in order to conclude that 
“the difference in price between those two products is virtually the same before 
taxation and after taxation”31 is an incomplete and inexact statement. In order to 
obtain a relatively credible result, one should also follow the inverse method, that is, 
check the difference in the relationship if tax rates on wine were applied to beer. 
“Higher taxation” results not only when one product is taxed more heavily but also 
when its competitors enjoy lighter tax burdens. 
 
Also, the argument based on the difference of final selling prices introduces a “fatal” 
presumption to the detriment of wine owing to its inevitably higher cost price.32 
Difference in final selling prices will always exist between the two products. This 
means, following the Court’s method, that there is always a margin to apply heavier 
tax rules to wine, as the starting difference will “absorb” discrimination. Of course, 
one could argue that as long as unequal tax treatment does not have any impact on 
consumption, there is no breach of Article 90’s second paragraph. This, however, 
undermines that scope of the Treaty’s provision to fight against all forms of tax 
discrimination including potential and indirect discrimination. 
 
This statement leads us to the most important criticism leveled against the ECJ’s 
method. The Court considers that the slight difference in the relationship of selling 
prices before and after taxation should not have any impact on consumer choice. 
Nevertheless, the Court does not justify why the established difference is too slight to 
potentially affect imported products. In the same Case (C-167/05), the Advocate 
General found that this difference was sufficient evidence of the breach by the 
Swedish tax system of the second paragraph of Article 90. These divergent points of 
view demonstrate that a far more sophisticated approach should have been applied.  
 
For similar reasons, the argument regarding statistical data is far from convincing. 
The Court itself recognized that changes in the tax treatment of wine and beer had a 
short-term impact on consumption. This should normally suffice to prove that 
heavier taxation has an impact on wine consumption. The extent of this impact 
cannot be evaluated through a simple comparison of sales data of competitive 
                                                 
31 Case C-167/05 Commission v. Sweden, cited above, para. 57. 
32 This approach has already been applied in Case 356/85 Commission v. Belgium, cited above, para. 
18. 
  7 products. Taxation fixes the final selling prices. This is only one factor among several 
that shape consuming tendencies. These other factors – habits is the first one should 
mention – are probably stronger than slight price fluctuations owing to tax reform. 
Article 90 does not, however, guarantee equal treatment of products on behalf of 
consumers; it only prohibits the potential influence – albeit slight – of tax 
discrimination on consumption. In this sense, one should not ask – as the Court 
indirectly does – why Swedish consumers stay loyal to beer but rather what the 
consumer reaction would have been, had tax arrangements been the same for the 
competitive products.  
 
 
IV. Taxation of alcohol revisited 
 
In Case C-167/05, Advocate General Mengozzi proposed a far simpler method of 
comparison, whose basic characteristic is the search for a maximum of objectivity in 
comparison of tax burdens.  
 
In fact, this method consists of uniting the second and third steps of the Court’s 
method regarding Article 90’s second paragraph. This method supposes that 
consumers are sensible of significant differences in final selling prices. The central 
element of “significant difference” is not only a matter of getting different results by 
applying one method of comparison. In order to insure credible results, the judge 
should combine assessment of tax arrangements by applying all possible criteria 
(volume, alcohol strength and selling prices). Important differences can only be 
justified for public interest purposes, such as anti-alcoholic policy, with respect to the 
usual limits imposed by the Court’s case law (mainly the proportionality principle). 
 
The fact that a potential effect of discrimination suffices for a breach of the second 
paragraph of Article 90 gives credit to this method. Also, in order to avoid dogmatic 
and therefore unfair results, this method only establishes a presumption of potential 
discrimination. Advocate General Mengozzi stated that the Swedish Government “has 
not made it possible to rule out the possibility that the difference in the taxation of 
beverages may affect competition”.33  
 
The problem with this method is that objectivity may lead to rather inflexible results 
that do not take into account the complexity of consumer attitude. What about those 
cases where the comparison of different criteria gave contradictory results? Should 
the possibility of significant difference be excluded without further analysis? 
It can also be argued that in the case of infringement procedures – which are the 
most frequent procedures – the burden of proof fixed by procedural law is reversed.34 
It should be up to the Commission to prove a definite violation of Article 90 and not 
simply demonstrate difference in taxation.  
 
In fact, the Court is not to blame for the uncertainty that rules over alcohol taxation. 
The margin of decision left to Member States by the European legislator is 
                                                 
33 Opinion in Case C-167/05, cited above, para. 85. 
34 K. Lenaerts, D. Arts, I. Maselis, Procedural Law of the European Union (20062 Thomson/Sweet & 
Maxwell) 162. 
  8 particularly important.35. This is a result of the rule of unanimous vote in taxation 
matters which prevents the European Union from making sufficiently precise choices 
on the balance between national tax autonomy and European integration. As Case C-
167/05 shows, however, the Court can still fix clearer criteria that should apply in 
order to check the conformity of a tax system with the demands of Article 90. Two 
distinct, but not incompatible, pathways seem accessible to the Court in order to 
insure compromise while gaining precision.   
 
Checking consumers’ effective sensibility towards taxation 
 
The ECJ is absolutely right to focus on consumer sensibility regarding prices. This is 
key to checking the conformity of alcohol taxation in the light of 90 EC (its second as 
well as its first paragraph). It would have been preferable, however, had consumers’ 
attitude and consuming tendencies not been invoked as marginal elements that help 
understanding of tax arrangements or, eventually, reverse presumption of non-
discrimination, but rather had been at the centre of judicial appreciation.  
 
Both quantitative and qualitative research should try specifically to identify to what 
degree there is a direct causal link between consumers’ attitude towards imported 
products on the one hand and the structure of taxation, the final tax burdens and 
difference in selling prices on the other. Social sciences as well as economics provide 
sophisticated survey tools (questionnaire, observation, interview, statistical analysis, 
etc.) whose overlap insures reliable results. Therefore, there would be no need to 
proceed to artificial comparison of schemes (“a litre of wine and a litre of beer”) or to 
unproven statements (“the difference before and after taxation is not significant 
enough to influence consumers’ choice”). In the case of the “consumers’ sensibility” 
method, the respect of methodological demands is a guarantee of the accuracy of the 
results obtained.  
 
Furthermore, this approach is coherent with the identification of “competitive” 
products of the second paragraph of Article 90.36 Given that the comparison of the 
effects of tax arrangements concerns products selected on the basis of consumer 
habits and perceptions, it is understandable that this comparison takes these 
consumer habits into consideration. After all, this approach is the closest to the intent 
of the second paragraph which tries to cover discriminative tax systems on the basis 
of their effect on consumption. 
 
This method would present another advantage that Court seems to have forgotten 
over the years.37 Taxation does not solely have an effect on consumption of 
interchangeable products, it can also establish – or, conversely, dislocate – “mutual 
substitutability” of products. Tax burdens and consequent final selling taxes help to 
                                                 
35 It has been almost 30 years (1980, in Case 168/78, cited above, para. 15) since the Commission 
affirmed before the Court “its intention to propose the introduction, at least in principle, of a single 
rate of tax in future Community regulations…” 
36 The same goes for the first paragraph’s “similar” products as long as similarity is based on the 
economic use of products. 
37 In Case 170/78, cited above, the Court pointed out that, “for the purpose of measuring the possible 
degree of substitution, attention should not be confined to consumer habits in a member state or in a 
given region. Those habits,could not be considered to be immutable; the tax policy of a member state 
must not therefore crystallize given consumer habits so as to consolidate an advantage acquired by 
national industries concerned to respond to them” (para. 8). In C-167/05, cited above, the Commission 
referred to this crystallization effect of taxation (para. 23).  
  9 form consumers’ belief about interchangeable beverages. From this perspective, 
instead of trying to fix in advance criteria for comparison, rules for tax arrangements 
and methods for evaluating statistical or accounting data, it is necessary to focus 
directly on the impact of tax arrangements on consumers’ perceptions and choices. 
 
 
To sum up, the control of consumers’ sensibility goes far beyond the interpretation of 
statistical information and even allows checking the tools of comparison. Thus, 
analyzing consumers’ reaction towards different alcoholic beverages in which 
different tax rules are applied answers the most crucial – from a legal standpoint – 
question: if the same tax treatment applied to certain imported and national 
products, would a significant number of consumers choose the former instead of the 
latter?    
 
 
Introducing the anti-alcoholic quest 
 
Alcohol has an impact both on the drinker (internal cost) and society (external cost) 
in terms of harmful effects (car accident, violence, illness…).38 Alcohol taxation has 
therefore both a fiscal and a paternalistic function. Thus, it insures that “each drinker 
takes into account all the external costs when making his drinking decision”.39 This is 
especially important for heavy drinking, in terms of consumption of significant 
quantities of alcoholic beverages or in terms of preference for beverages with 
significant alcohol strength. Also, taxation of heavy drinking responds to the need to 
compensate for the reduction of low-risk moderate drinking and the subsequent loss 
of revenue by the welfare services. On the other hand, taxation has an impact on 
selling prices, an element that deters consumers from heavy drinking, unless there is 
already an addiction problem. Taxation stands as an instrument for prevention in the 
field of public health policy. 
 
EU Law does not remain indifferent to the anti-alcoholic claim. Since the “Cassis de 
Dijon” Case,40 the relationship between alcohol taxation and protection of public 
health is apprehended in terms of an exception to free movement of goods. From a 
teleological perspective, the same approach could apply in the case of internal 
taxation for impediment in cross-border movement of goods is also at stake. 
Contrary, however, to Article 28 EC, which remains inapplicable on the basis of the 
defenses of public interest provided by Article 30, the provisions of Article 90 do not 
contain any exception clauses. The demands for equal treatment and tax neutrality 
seem absolute in the sense that public purposes cannot justify any discriminative tax 
measures.  
 
Nevertheless, ECJ’s case law recognizes that public interest can totally exclude any 
breach of Article 90 whenever objective justifications permit it. In Case 196/85, the 
Court stated that “in the present state of Community Law, Article 95 of the EEC 
Treaty does not prohibit Member States, in the pursuit of legitimate economic or 
social aims, from granting tax advantages, in the form of exemptions from or 
                                                 
38 Sijbren Cnossen, “Do drinkers pay their way to the European Union?”, in S. Cnossen (ed.), D. 
Forrest, S. Smith, Taxation and Regulation of Smoking, Drinking and Gambling in the European 
Union (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 2009), 43 seq.    
39 Sijbren Cnossen, cited above, 44.    
40  Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral, ECR [1979] 649. 
  10reduction of taxes, to certain types of spirits or to certain classes of producers, 
provided that such preferential systems are extended without discrimination to 
imported products conforming to the same conditions as preferred domestic 
products” (emphasis added).41 Protection of morality,42 regional development and – 
why not? – public health43 can justify tax arrangements that otherwise would have 
constituted a breach of Article 90 (first or second paragraph).  
 
Therefore, as long as the European Union has not regulated the question of alcohol 
taxation in the light of public health objectives (despite the overlapping of the two 
questions), Member States can conduct their own anti-alcoholic policies by all 
possible means, including taxation. 
 
Hence, tax arrangements can apply either on the basis of alcohol strength or of 
volume. In the first case, taxation is based on a uniform tax rate applied to alcoholic 
strength by volume. It is by far the most objective method that reflects the social cost 
claim. The second case rests upon consumption and calls for a flat tax rate on the 
quantity of alcoholic beverages consumed.  
 
Of course, tax rates should take into account the social context of drinking. The same 
tax rates would apply at least to “similar” and “competitive” products. Consuming 
tendencies and habits are important in order to delimitate the relevant market in the 
light of the second paragraph of Article 90, whereas the first paragraph will 
rediscover its initial function, related to products with similar production 
characteristics. From the moment the similarity or mutual substitutability of 
beverages is established, however, there is in principle no place either for consuming 
attitudes towards prices to enter the equation or for the Member State to apply 
different tax rates or different tax arrangements according to the beverage type.  
 
In fact, the method proves to be less promising for the Member States than one might 
think. Of course, the social cost claim (the protection of public interest) can justify 
different tax burdens for beer and wine that may affect imported products. The Court 
should, however, check anti-alcoholic policy claims according to its classic standards 
and verify that tax arrangements do not dissimulate protective measures against 
imported products. 
 
The major problem with this public policy argument is its inflexibility. Applying 
taxation purely on the basis of anti-alcoholic objectives neglects the fact that both the 
social and legal contexts of drinking are far more complex. To stay within the limits of 
EC Law, it would be quite difficult for a Member State applying this method and 
producing mainly low-alcohol beverages to avoid infringement of Article 90 EC, 
especially with regard to proportionality. There are other ways to fight heavy drinking 
and addiction without drastically affecting sales of imported drinks. Therefore, the 
social cost method should be applied in a moderate way and be combined with other 
public policy instruments. 
 
These difficulties demonstrate that the social cost method suggests the intervention 
of the European Union through harmonization measures in order to fix the possible 
                                                 
41 Case 196/85 Commission v. France [1597] ECR 1597, para. 7. 
42 Case 252/86 Bergandi [1988] ECR 1343, para. 32. 
43 See Case 140/79 Chemial Farmaceutici [1981] ECR 1, para. 12, concerning alcohol production; cf. 
Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law, cited above, p. 54. 
  11  12
                                                
applications and the limits of this approach, since the actual structure remains too 
elusive.  
 
V. Concluding remarks: sharing the burden of proof 
 
These suggestions call for a clear as well as a fair division of the burden of proof 
before the ECJ.     
 
Regarding the effect of taxation on consumers’ attitude, with respect to EU 
procedural law,44 the burden of proof should remain with the European Commission. 
This means in practice that the EU institution would be responsible for preparing or 
asking for such specific quantitative and qualitative studies. As for the Member 
States, they should always be legally authorized either to contest the accuracy of the 
specific results or to invoke reasons of public interest justifying derogation. 
 
In order to organize its work better and, most of all, insure a minimum of uniformity 
in its approach, the Commission should establish and disseminate standards and 
guidelines concerning the criteria of this economic analysis. This should also serve as 
a warning or at least a compass for national tax systems that would have acknowledge 
of eventual discriminative measures and at the risk of legal proceedings either before 
the ECJ or national courts could progressively erase protective tax arrangements on 
alcohol. Finally, this would permit the Commission to explore possible ways of 
conciliation between the demands of Article 90 and anti-alcoholic demands. In this 
context, EU action would seem much more coherent, and therefore convincing, to 
Member States, and such a process could lead in the future to concrete EU legislative 
measures on the question. 
 
On the other hand, the anti-alcoholic claim through tax regulations calls for an 
important effort on behalf of the Member State in order to prove the conformity of its 
tax regulations with regard to the demands of Article 90 EC. Here a presumption of 
violation is (or should be) already established by the plaintiff and the argument of 
public policy objectives justifying tax arrangement appears like a “last minute” 
chance for national authorities before the final affirmation of a breach of Article 90. 
Therefore, it is up to the Member State to persuade the Court as to the accuracy of tax 
arrangements and, above all, the element of proportionality.   
 
44 K. Lenaerts, D. Arts, I. Maselis, Procedural Law of the European Union, cited above. 